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Before and Beyond 
the Clash of Civilizations 
Although China and the “Sinic civiliza-
tion” may pose the greatest challenge 
to Western hegemony, the Clash thesis 
would not have achieved its tremen-
dous resonance without the spectre of 
a perceived Islamic threat. However seri-
ous some of the analytical flaws of The 
Clash of Civilization, its author cannot be 
faulted for hiding the original source of 
the central concept and title of his influ-
ential book. Not only does Huntington 
refer to Bernard Lewis’s “The Roots of 
Muslim Rage,”1 but also quotes its telling conclusion: “It should now be 
clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the 
level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is 
no less than a clash of civilizations—that perhaps irrational but surely his-
toric reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”2 In the years since 
Lewis wrote these lines and elaborated on them in several best-selling 
books of his own on Islam and the Middle East, the public perception of 
the two authors has become increasingly entwined, especially as the twin 
ideological gurus of the Bush administration’s Middle East policy. In this 
brief discussion I show that the two authors make diametrically opposite 
theoretical and political uses of their common understanding of Islam 
and thereby produce sharply contrasting variants of the clash thesis. Thus 
understood, each may serve as a platform for the critical evaluation of the 
other and the development of a more defensible account of Islam in the 
contemporary world. To clear the ground for such a move, however, we 
need to first reconsider their shared conception of Islam.
Put in simple comparative terms, for Lewis Islamdom’s fundamental 
historical problem has been that Islam was not Christianity. To make mat-
ters worse, for over a thousand years this original and ultimate failure was 
preached and indeed experienced as a blessing. But now, Lewis asserts, 
“it may be that the Muslims, having contracted a Christian illness, will con-
sider a Christian remedy, that is to say, the separation of religion and the 
state.” This would entail addressing the challenges overcome by Refor-
mation and Enlightenment, albeit “in their own way.” But, Lewis despairs, 
“there is little sign” that Muslims are so interested.3 He thus considers it 
more reasonable if all parties faced the fact that the real choice in the 
Middle East is between a fundamentalism that attributes “all evil to the 
abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam … [and] secular democracy, 
best embodied in the Turkish Republic founded by Kemal Ataturk.”4 Lewis 
does not claim “that the movement nowadays called Fundamentalism is 
… the only Islamic tradition” or that “Islam as such” should be blamed for 
the decline of Muslim states.5 He does, however, cancel the significance 
of the diversity of claimants to Islam by asserting the overriding continu-
ity of hegemonic Islam and the “great institution of caliphate” until the 
Kemalist revolution.6 There is thus, in his view, a clear causal connection 
between militant fundamentalism’s current ascendancy and its authen-
ticity. Under Islam “the state was the church and church was the state and 
God was head of both.”7 This theocratic legacy and ideal evidently clashes 
with modernity. Put in Huntington’s pithy formulation: “the underlying 
problem for the west is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam.”8
The clash of the clashists
Beyond this central point, however, Lewis and Huntington part ways. 
Whereas Huntington’s version of the Clash requires the sustainability of 
such an “anti-western” trajectory and thus distinguishes “westernization” 
from “modernization,” for Lewis the two are identical manifestations of a 
universal civilization whose incompatibility with Islam ensures that Mus-
lim societies fall “further back in the lengthening line of eager and more 
successful Westernizers, notably in East Asia.”9 This reinforces Lewis’s com-
mitment to support “freedom seekers” 
in the Middle East to the point of risk-
ing “the hazards of regime change”10 to 
complete the Kemalist Westernization. 
In contrast, for Huntington, Kemalism 
engenders “torn countries” doomed to 
failure. Echoing Lewis’s old nemesis, Ed-
ward Said and his third worldist associ-
ates, Huntington finds that “Western be-
lief in the universality of Western culture 
suffers three problems: it is false … im-
moral, and … dangerous … Imperialism 
is the necessary logical consequence of universalism.”11 This underpins 
the “most important” element of his general policy blueprint for Western 
states: “Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is prob-
ably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global 
conflict.”12
It may now be clearer why both of these otherwise opposed agendas 
are dependent on Islam’s theocratic continuity. The spread of a universal-
ist Islam committed to a “neutral” public space in which it may compete or 
co-operate with other religious and ideological agendas, including other 
varieties of Islam, undermines the viability of an international “multicul-
tural” order built around Huntington’s competitive “mono-cultural” civili-
zations. It would also extend the choices facing the Middle East beyond 
Lewis’s favoured Kemalism and feared fundamentalism.
The deleted re-formations
In line with the Islamic orthodoxy’s official discourse, Lewis’s seamless 
theocratic anti-Judeo-Christian-modern account of Islam, ignores at least 
four major re-formations: first, Mohammad’s resolution of the Judeo-
Christian limbo; second, the proto democratic fusion of state-community 
in the era of the rightly-guided caliphs; third, the rise of dynastic caliphate 
and separation of the state-community; fourth, the still unfolding and 
contested reformation triggered by Western modernity.13 Together, these 
intra-Islamic re-formations fuel the current confluences and clashes with-
in Islamdom as much as between “Islam” and the “West.” 
Rather than an alternative to Judaism and Christianity, Islam claimed to 
restore them to their original purity. In this “final” re-formation of the Ab-
rahamic tradition, Mohammad anticipated Protestantism in some areas 
and went beyond it in others. The fusion of temporal and spiritual author-
ity in Islam’s sacred age realized the millenarian Jewish longing for the 
age when Israelites were united under a single prophet-king. Judaism, 
as Weber observed, “never in theory rejected the state and its coercion 
but, on the contrary, expected in the Messiah their own masterful politi-
cal ruler.”14 Mohammad, however, fulfilled this expectation by extending, 
in line with Christian universalism, Yahweh’s immediate constituency to 
humanity as a whole. This infusion of mundane politics with sacred en-
ergy and mission paralleled Puritanism’s transformation of economic re-
lations. By promising worldly achievement as well as other-worldly salva-
tion, Islam, too, invites Muslims (and non-Muslims) to judge the record 
of its dominion and set right what may seem wrong and, in the process, 
change or abandon the actually existing Islam.
The primary authority for reformism necessarily lies in Islam’s sacred age. 
Lewis underlines the political character of that age, but ignores that it had 
two distinct, essentially theocratic and democratic phases, each respec-
tively associated with the rule of Mohammad and his first four successors. 
Dependent on direct revelation and the “seal of prophets,” Mohammad’s 
theocracy was unique and irreproducible. In contrast, its nascent demo-
cratic successor represented a “human” order and was therefore in prin-
ciple sustainable or reproducible. Ironically, however, the participatory 
polity of the early caliphs soon became historically unsustainable; first, 
because it lacked the institutional mechanisms for channelling its own 
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political vitality and multiple sources of conflict; and, secondly, because 
it nevertheless succeeded in turning itself into an expansive empire, and 
no empire has yet been run along democratic lines. If Christianity had to 
adapt itself to an initially impenetrable empire, Islam was thus compelled 
to accommodate the empire of its own making and consequently revert-
ed to a new variant of the same historical trajectory. 
After the rule of the “rightly guided” caliphs, all the notable branches 
of Islam were consolidated in response to the question posed by the 
Umayyad’s forcible seizure and transformation of caliphate into a he-
reditary institution: how to reconcile the separation of the sword and 
the word with their self-appointed role as the trustees of the sacred era’s 
unity of the sword and the word. The Sharia and the politico-theological 
agenda that shaped it proved the winning solution following the victory 
of Ibn Hanbal, the “seal of the jurists,” over the rationalist theologians in 
Islam’s third century. By sanctifying and drawing on the prophet’s largely 
fabricated words and deeds (tradition/sunna), the “traditionist” scholars 
that developed the Sharia created a new divine source on par with the 
Quran which enabled them to (a) extend and resolve Quran’s limited and 
ambiguous legal content and (b) trump all living claimants to Islam with 
the legacy of the dead prophet and (c) guarantee their own role as guard-
ians of what became a well-guarded but mummified Islam. Ideologically 
thus armed, the men of the word in effect struck a “second best” bargain 
with the wielders of the sword that both recognized the separation of po-
litical and religious realms and masked it in line with the legacy of the sa-
cred era. Accordingly, the caliphs, whilst retaining the title of “commander 
of the faithful,” had very little to do with matters of faith, and the Sharia 
whilst projecting a comprehensive and binding reach, in fact stopped 
short of regulating the political sphere. 
It is the uncritical (or politically driven) adoption of the normative quasi-
totalitarian layer of the orthodoxy’s complex agenda that allows Lewis to 
imagine a Sharia anchored in “what we in the West would call constitu-
tional law and political philosophy,”15 when a glance at any actual ver-
sion of Sharia confirms that “it said virtually nothing about ‘constitutional’ 
or administrative law.”16 The same applies to his similarly plausible but 
equally misleading claim about the continuity of the caliphate between 
the rightly-guided Abu Bakr and the Ottoman Abd al-Majid.17As Lewis 
fails to note, the caliphate was punctured by the rise of Umayyads, sub-
sequently marginalized by various Sultanates, and abolished by the Mon-
gols. The Ottomans eventually reclaimed the title, but, as Hamid Enayat 
explains, only in the late eighteenth century and “in order to equip … [the 
Ottoman ruler] with a spiritual authority” commensurate with that of “Em-
press of Russia as patroness of orthodox Christianity.”18
Islam and modernity
Because generally unacknowledged or unpursued, the historically una-
voidable unravelling of Mohammad’s political reform of the Abrahamic 
tradition could not be accompanied by the legitimate rationalization of 
the patrimonial state or the reactivation of the self-paralyzed religious 
establishment. Thus Islam’s emerging multi-actor society could not be 
consolidated. This in turn helps explain the transformation of Islam from 
being at birth “remarkably modern”19 to entering the modern world belat-
edly, in greatest need of renewal and pregnant with several latent, theo-
cratic, democratic, and “privatized” reform agendas with no authoritative 
midwife(s) in place to nurture and deliver an evolved “rightly-guided” pol-
ity that could flourish in the new context. 
Contrary to its materialist and “anti-orientalist” critics, Lewis’s “oriental-
ism” is not to be faulted with asking Muslims to ask themselves “What 
went wrong?” or with stressing the need for an Islamic reformation and 
yet despairing of the difficulties of achieving it, thereby turning to the 
seemingly straighter secular-democratic path. His chief failure as an histo-
rian, political advisor, and self-proclaimed democrat lies in his obliterating 
the cause of democratic reform. He does so, first, by promoting ortho-
dox Islam’s normative claim to theocratic continuity and thus buttress-
ing the fundamentalists’ case for theocracy, and, secondly, by ignoring 
the reformist tendencies that have variously questioned this claim. Lewis 
thus buries or reburies all those Muslims, from the eponymous founders 
of the orthodox Sunni schools of law and the Shia Imams, to Sayyid Jamal, 
Abduh, Naini, Iqbal, and their contemporary followers in the democratic 
or democratically evolving Islamist organizations, that have also asked 
“what went wrong?” Lewis even avoids the point in his own lifetime when 
the hegemony of an Islam at once “enlightened” and “authentic” seemed 
assured in view of the evolutionary renewal of Islam’s aborted democratic 
and rationalist tendencies. Consider the following observation:
“The most remarkable phenomenon of the modern history is … the 
enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving 
towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for Eu-
ropean culture … is only a further development of some of the most 
important phases of the culture of Islam.”20 
This is Iqbal speaking in 1928. To understand the rising fundamentalist 
tide that has now submerged his Islamic world, the questions Huntington 
raises about Kemalism and the imperialist face of Western universalism 
are essential. However, he does not pursue them beyond the limits set by 
the clash thesis, and Lewis’s theocratic view of Islam. Lewis himself looks 
the wrong way, not only by writing off the costs of Ataturk’s authoritarian-
ism, but also by underestimating his hero’s exceptional achievement and 
assuming that it could be replicated by the likes of an Ahmad Chalabi in 
Iraq or elsewhere, arriving at the forefront of invading armies. As the only 
pro-Western Muslim leader to have defeated Western armies, Ataturk 
achieved the authority to institutionalize secularism to a degree that it 
was able to survived its major design faults and the Islamist threat. In the 
process, each side has been compelled to recognize the staying power 
or merits of the other as well as release their own democratic tendencies. 
Similarly, by conveniently adopting the official discourses of Kemalism 
and Khomeinism, Lewis bypasses both the contributions of Kemalism 
and imperialism to the rise of Iranian fundamentalism, and the instructive 
parallels between the evolving legacies of Ataturk and Khomeini. The fun-
damentalist ascendancy in the revolution that Khomeini made his own 
would have been inconceivable without the CIA-engineered coup that 
removed the democratically elected coalition of liberal nationalists and 
Islamists, and paved the path for the last Shah’s suicidal variant of Kemal-
ism. Yet, as a religious example of Huntington’s “torn” states, the Islamic 
republic has survived its own contradictory and crisis -prone foundations 
in part thanks to its competitive, if highly restricted, electoral politics. 
Kemalism and Khomeinism thus meet not only as polarized alternatives 
of their fundamentalist advocates, but also as overlapping trajectories in 
emerging religious-secular democratic fields. This is not to equate Tur-
key’s evolutionary developments with that of the 
still theocratically gridlocked Iran or to suggest 
that the latter will necessarily be reformed without 
a major upheaval. But it should be clear that Iran’s 
theocracy or Turkey’s military-led shadow state, let 
alone the altogether more regressive autocracies 
in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, will not be hurried off 
the historical stage by Huntington’s “international 
multiculturalism” or the more familiar versions of 
conservative realism now back in vogue following 
the Iraq disaster. 
Under the double banner of “the Middle East is 
not ready for and Islam is not interested in democ-
racy,” the rejuvenated realists are asking the Middle 
Easterners to choose between anti-western theoc-
racies and pro-western autocracies also reliant on 
unreformed Islam for some residual legitimacy. The 
barbaric pluralism on display in Iraq, unleashed as 
well as reinforced and created by the occupation, 
however, can only be overcome by a democratic 
state capable of enforcing the joint Quranic and lib-
eral injunction that “in religion there should be no 
compulsion.” Such states will not arise by Western 
leaders or Middle Eastern elites (and counter elites) 
preaching democracy and practising autocracy; 
but nor will they emerge if all started preaching and 
practising autocracy. The democratic (re-)fusion of 
the state and society in the Muslim world would be 
advanced not only through the evolutionary recov-
ery of Islam’s democratic and rationalist heritage in 
its ongoing reformation, but also by the reform of 
the US dominated regional/international regime 
that has altogether retarded the progress of such a 
project in the name of democracy and rationalism.
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